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Case No. 20100080-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Antonie Darnell Harris, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for the lesser included offense of assault, 
a Class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
I02(3)(b) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant asserts that he timely raised a Batson objection in a sidebar 
conference, which the trial court erroneously rejected. Alternatively, he claims that 
the trial court plainly erred and that trial counsel was ineffective for not timely 
resolving the matter. He also claims that despite the trial court's ultimate implicit 
denial of the objection, the trial court erred and his trial counsel was ineffective 
because no detailed ruling was entered. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Issue 1. (a) Did Defendant waive a Batson objection when he passed the jury 
for cause before raising an objection, and then allowed the jury to be sworn and the 
remainder of the venire to be dismissed before the objection was resolved? (b) May 
Defendant circumvent this waiver by claiming plain error and ineffective assistance 
of counsel? 
Standard of Review. Waiver is determined as a matter of law. State v. Rosa-Re, 
2008 UT 53, \ 6,190 P.3d 1259; State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, If 11,140 P.3d 1219). To 
preserve a Batson objection, the objection must be raised and resolved "before the 
jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is dismissed/7 Rosa-Re, 2008 
UT 53, Tf^f 8,13. The trial court has an "obligation" to timely resolve a Batson 
objection, but "defense counsel also has an absolute obligation to notify the court 
that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed. Failure 
to do so, or acquiescing in the court's inaction . . . constitute^] a waiver of the 
original objection." Id. at f f^ 13,14. 
2. If the merits are considered, has Defendant established reversible error? * 
Standard of Review. When the issue is preserved, a trial court's denial of a 
Batson violation is reviewed for clear error. State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,120,994 P.2d 
1
 The State reverses the order of Defendant's arguments to place the 
procedural argument before the substantive. The State's Point I responds to 
Defendant's Point II, and conversely, the State's Point II responds to Defendant's 
Point I. 
2 
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177. Recognizing the possibility of waiver, Defendant alternatively seeks review of 
the merits under plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish plain 
error, Defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/' State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). To establish counsel ineffectiveness, Defendant must "(i) identify 
specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of reasonable 
professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or omission and 
under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that counsel's error 
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable 
probability" of a more favorable outcome. Id. at 1225 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 & 694 (1984)) (other citations omitted). This 
prejudice standard is "equivalent to the harmfulness test [courts] apply in 
determining plain error." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225 (citations omitted). 
Under any of the three standards, reversal of Defendant's conviction is not 
justified unless Defendant establishes, at a minimum, that his Batson objection had 
merit, that is, that the prosecutor's strike was exercised solely for a racially 
discriminatory purpose in violation of equal protection. 
3 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), prohibits a party from purposefully 
discriminating by striking a juror solely on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Add. D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In January 2008, Defendant was charged with aggravated assault of Sara 
Michel (Count I) and misdemeanor assault of his cohabitant Amber Wardle (Count 
II). Rl-3. The Salt Lake Defender Association (LDA) was assigned to represent 
Defendant, but LDA subsequently withdrew when Defendant retained private 
counsel, Stephen R. McCaughey. R6-7,10,44. 
A one-day jury trial was held in October 2009. R187-89. The venire was 
questioned and some members were dismissed for cause. R224:l-22; R158 (Add. A). 
The parties then silently exercised their respective peremptory jury strikes. Id. 
During this process, the judge read aloud to the venire an excerpt from an article 
entitled "Do You Swear That You Will Well and Truly Try?" R224:22-28. When the 
judge finished, the parties still had not completed their strikes, so the judge 
continued to briefly explain the jury selection process to the venire. R224:28-29. See 
Add. A. 
After the parties completed their strikes, but before the selected jurors were 
announced, the court asked defense counsel, //[F]or the record, Mr. McCaughey, you 
4 
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did pass the jury for cause?" R224:29. Defense counsel replied, "I think we need to 
approach for a minute," and immediately added, "Oh, we do pass for cause, yes." 
Id. See Add. A. 
During the ensuing sidebar conference, defense counsel stated his intention to 
challenge one prosecution strike under Batson: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: The concern (inaudible) is Juror No. 3 is struck 
by the State (inaudible) ability (inaudible) she needs to justify 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right, do you have a reason for that? 
PROSECUTOR: Yeah, (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Why don't we put that on the record during the break? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, I just wanted to inform you (inaudible). 
R224:29-30. The sidebar conference then ended. See Add. B. 
The court announced the names of the selected jurors. R224:30-31. The 
remainder of the venire, including the allegedly wrongfully stricken juror, was 
dismissed and left the courtroom. R224:30. Defendant did not object. The selected 
jurors were then sworn. R224:31. Again, Defendant did not object. See Add. B. 
During a subsequent recess, the court stated, "Mr. McCaughey did ask to 
approach the bench on a Batson [cjhallenge," and the court invited defense counsel 
to "make that on the record now." R224:32. Defense counsel then articulated his 
Batson objection for the first time: 
5 
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[Bjased on the [Sjtate's taking off Juror No. 3, [Jonathan Chau], who 
clearly was the only minority on the jury, as I looked through . . . my 
notes on his answers, there's nothing in there that would indicate any 
reason to take him off the jury other than the fact that he was 27 years 
old and was obvious. . . of the Asian race and so I think the State has to 
justify why they took that person off the jury.2 
R224:32-33. See Add. C. 
The court asked the prosecutor to explain her strike. The prosecutor 
responded that she struck Chau based on his lack of attentiveness: 
[W]hen I was watching [Chau] during the time that [the judge] was 
reading the story to the jurors, he was not paying attention. He kept 
putting his head down, he wasn't listening and that concerns me when 
someone doesn't want to pay attention. I also noted in my notes that 
he kept looking at me funny and so any time I get a bad feeling from a 
juror and if they're not paying attention, initially I was going to leave 
him on and then he just wasn't paying attention. He has to pay 
attention during the jury trial. 
I had concerns about (inaudible) Bunting as well but the defense had 
struck her. I didn't know if she would have any problems with her or 
anything but . . . the defense struck her as number 4, but she was 
actually paying attention and listening to what [the court] had to say 
and Jonathan was not paying attention. 
R224:33. See Add. C. 
2
 Jonathan's last name is spelled "Chau" (Vietnamese) on the jury list, but is 
spelled "Chow" (Chinese) in the transcript. Compare R158, with R224:4 (Add. A). See 
www.meaning-of-names.com/asia-and-pacific/c-names-2.asp. Chau was the fifth 
juror listed, but the third juror struck by the State. R158. He was a 27-year-old full-
time university student, who did not otherwise work, was born and raised in Utah, 
and was single without children. R224:4. 
6 
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The court confirmed that Defendant was a racial minority, but not Asian. 
R224: 33-34. The court then asked defense counsel if there was "[a]nything else we 
need to put on the record?" R224:34. Defense counsel suggested that Chau's actions 
might not mean he was inattentive: 
I guess my response to that is, it's hard for somebody to tell if 
somebody is paying attention. People have different ways of paying 
attention and this is a smaller room (inaudible) reading to them or 
talking to them and so the fact that somebody is looking around or 
something, I don't think is necessarily they're not paying attention. So 
I don't think that's sufficient, but just so the record is clear. 
Id. The court thanked counsel, said "all right," and recessed. Id. Defense counsel 
did not ask the court to enter findings or otherwise make a more specific ruling on 
the Batson objection. See Add. C. 
Trial then continued. R187-98. Amber, Defendant's former girlfriend, did not 
testify and the court dismissed the misdemeanor assault charge involving her 
(Count II). R224:118-20. The court instructed the jury on the felony aggravated 
assault charge involving Amber's friend Sara (Count I) and, at Defendant's request, 
also instructed the jury on two lesser included offenses: Class A misdemeanor 
assault with substantial bodily injury and Class B misdemeanor simple assault. 
R224:141-42; R179-84. See Add. D. The jury found Defendant guilty of Class B 
misdemeanor assault. R186. 
7 
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On December 18,2009, the court sentenced Defendant to 180 days in jail, but 
suspended the jail sentence and placed him on probation. R195-97. Defendant 
timely appealed. R201. The court of appeals subsequently certified the appeal to 
this Court. See Court of Appeals Order, No. 2010080-CA, dated June 6, 2011. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his misdemeanor conviction/the facts are only briefly summarized. 
In December 2007, Amber wanted her boyfriend (Defendant) to move out of 
their apartment and asked her friend Sara to be with her when she told him. 
R224:48-53. At the apartment, a quarrel erupted. Defendant called Sara "a slut" and 
"a whore." R224:55. Sara retorted that Defendant was "a bastard and an asshole." 
R224:55-56. Defendant ordered Sara to leave and followed her to the front door, 
where he pushed and choked her "[h]ard enough to where [she] couldn't breathe." 
R224:56,58. Sara hit Defendant, called him "the 'n' word," and said, "Let me go. 
You wanted me out. I was leaving. Just let me go." R224:57-59. 
Amber asked Sara to stay and Defendant "put his fist up like he was going to 
hit" Amber. Id. Sara stepped between the two. Id. Defendant pushed Sara to the 
floor, "jumped" on top of her, and again began choking her. He threatened, "Do 
you want to die, bitch. You're going to die." Id. Sara told Amber to get help. 
8 
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R224:63. When Amber ran out of the apartment, Defendant got off Sara and chased 
Amber. R224:63-64. 
Defendant admitted that Sara's account of the assault was essentially true, but 
claimed that she had pushed him first and, in self-defense, he grabbed her by the 
throat and pushed her back. R224:123-25,129-31. Defendant admitted that he "lost 
sight of... what [he] was doing" when he threw Sara to the ground and choked her 
a second time. R224:125,132-33. He justified his response because: (1) the "n—" 
word "instills a lot of rage in black people in general"; (2) he was bipolar and not on 
medication; and (3) he was "defending himself." R224:134-35,137-38. 
The police photographed Sara's visible bruises and scratches, but she required 
no medical treatment. R224:65-67,78-79. At trial, a medical expert described the 
general nature of the injuries depicted in the photographs. R224:109-16. The jury 
did not find that the injuries were "serious" or "substantial" and acquitted 
Defendant of felony aggravated assault and Class A assault with substantial bodily 
injury. R179-83,186. The jury rejected Defendant's claim of self-defense and 
convicted him of Class B misdemeanor assault. R180,182,186. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction or claim other trial error. He argues, nevertheless, that his conviction 
9 
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should be reversed because the prosecutor purposefully discriminated by striking 
venire member Chau solely based on his race. 
Defendant asserts that he properly preserved a Batson objection during a 
sidebar conference, before the jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire was 
dismissed. Under well-established Utah precedent, he did not. Defendant waived 
his objection by passing the jury for cause before even mentioning Batson, and by 
permitting the jury to be sworn and the venire to be dismissed before the Batson 
objection was argued and resolved. 
Defendant alternatively argues that even if he waived his Batson objection, its 
merits may be reviewed under plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
merits should not be considered, because waiver in the context of Batson precludes 
plain error review. And waiver in the context of Batson should also preclude a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In any case, even if the merits are considered, Defendant fails to establish 
reversible error. Defendant alleges various procedural errors in the handling of the 
Batson objection. But no procedural error supports reversal of a conviction if the 
underlying claim has no merit. Consequently, whether the merits are directly 
reviewed or reviewed under plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Defendant must, at a minimum, establish that his Batson objection had merit and 
should or would have been granted. This, in turn, requires Defendant to establish 
10 
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that the prosecutor purposefully discriminated by striking Chau solely based on his 
race. Because Defendant fails to make this showing, his claims should be rejected 
and his otherwise valid conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS BATSON OBJECTION; HE SHOULD 
NOT BE ALLOWED TO CIRCUMVENT THAT WAIVER BY 
CLAIMING PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL ON APPEAL 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits racial 
discrimination in jury selection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Under 
Batson, a party is prohibited from peremptorily striking a potential juror solely on 
the basis of the juror's race; and if an opponent believes the party has purposefully 
discriminated in exercising a strike, the opponent may object. See id. at 89 & 94-97. 
A Batson objection, however, is not "itself a peremptory challenge, but rather 
an objection to . . . [the] improper use of peremptory challenges/' State v. Valdez, 
2006 UT 394 25,140 P.3d 1219 (emphasis in original) [hereafter referred to as Valdez 
II\. A Batson objection thus is best understood as a claim that the selected jury is 
'"improperly constituted'" in violation of equal protection. Id. (quoting Powers v. 
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991)). Because the objection is to the selected jury's 
composition, it must be raised and resolved before jury selection is completed — that 
11 
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is, before the selected jurors are sworn and the remainder of the venire is dismissed. 
See State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,113-14,190 P.3d 1259; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, If 44. 
Defendant claims that he timely raised a Batson objection during a sidebar 
conference that occurred before the jury was sworn and the venire was dismissed. 
Br.Aplt. at 32-38. He also asserts that the objection was summarily rejected in the 
same sidebar. Id. Alternatively, Defendant argues that even if he waived 
consideration of his Batson claim, its merits may be reviewed under plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 38-42. Both claims lack merit. 
Although Defendant in the sidebar conference indicated an intention to raise 
a Batson objection, he had already passed the jury for cause. Following the sidebar 
conference, but before the Batson objection was argued or resolved, Defendant 
allowed the jury to be sworn and the remainder of the venire, including the 
allegedly wrongfully stricken juror, to be dismissed. Only then did defense counsel 
state the grounds for his Batson objection. And only then was the objection resolved. 
Under well-established Utah precedent, consideration of the merits is not preserved, 
but waived. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, \ 14. 
In the context of Batson, waiver, like invited error, precludes plain error 
review. In this context, it should also preclude a.claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Utah's "bright line" timely-raise-or-waive rule was adopted to prevent a 
defendant from sandbagging and strategically planting Batson error. Id. at f % 8,13; 
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Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44 & n.22. Allowing this rule to be circumvented by an 
allegation of ineffectiveness would unduly benefit defendants and encourage more 
sandbagging with Batson claims. 
Alternatively, as discussed in Point II, even if the Batson claim is deemed 
preserved or is reviewable under plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Defendant fails to establish reversible error. 
A, Utah's waiver rule requires that a Batson objection be raised and 
resolved before the jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire is 
dismissed. 
A defendant has "the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected 
pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria." Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86. See also Valdez II, 
2006 UT 39, ^  13. A party is prohibited from intentionally discriminating by striking 
a juror solely on the basis of race. Id. If an opponent believes that the party 
exercised a strike with discriminatory intent, the opponent may object. Id. 
Resolution of a Batson objection involves "an evidentiary framework similar to that 
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, If 14. 
First, the opponent of the peremptory challenges must establish a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the 
petit jury. . . . In other words, the challenging party must produce 
evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 
discrimination has occurred. . . . Second, once the opponent has 
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the 
peremptory challenges to rebut the prima facie case by offering neutral, 
nondiscriminatory justifications for the peremptory challenges. . . . 
Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the 
13 
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peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the 
opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful 
discrimination. 
Id. at If 15 (citations and internal marks omitted). If the objection is granted and the 
strike set aside, the wrongfully stricken juror is reinstated, unless the trial court 
determines that an alternative remedy is necessary. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24; 
Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, If 44. 
Batson protects multiple rights. It protects a litigant's right to a fairly selected 
jury and also jurors' rights to be fairly considered for jury service. Valdez II, 2006 UT 
39, *([ 17. Moreover, "the entire community has an interest in fair jury selection 
procedures" because "[w]hen jurors are excluded pursuant to discriminatory 
selection criteria, 'public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice' is 
undermined." Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87). Thus, a litigant raising a Batson 
objection asserts not only his own equal protection right, but also the equal 
protection rights of the "wrongfully struck jurors." Id. at n.12 (citing Powers, 499 
U.S. at 413-415). 
To best ensure that jurors' rights are protected and that wrongfully stricken 
jurors are promptly reinstated on the jury, Utah has adopted a "bright line" timely-
raise-or-waive rule. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,118,12; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 38. Under 
that rule, the opponent of the challenged strike —here Defendant—must clearly 
articulate a Batson objection before the selected jurors are sworn and the remainder 
14 
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of the venire is dismissed. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ^ 12. Once an objection is properly 
articulated, the trial court has "an obligation to resolve" it, id. at f^ 13, but Defendant 
bears the ultimate responsibility for its timely resolution: 
[T] rial courts have an obligation to resolve Bat son objections before the 
jury is sworn and the venire dismissed. Given that the express purpose 
of Batson is to correct a constitutionally deficient jury composition 
before the jury is actually seated and sworn, postponing the resolution 
is inappropriate. 
Moreover, in the event that the trial court fails to timely resolve a 
Batson objection, defense counsel also has an absolute obligation to 
notify the court that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and 
the venire dismissed. Failure to do so, or acquiescing in the court's 
inaction, wil l . . . constitute a waiver of the original objection. 
Id. at\^ 13-14. (emphasis added). 
B. Defendant waived his Batson objection. 
As stated, Defendant claims that he timely raised his Batson objection during 
the sidebar conference before the jury was sworn and the venire was dismissed. 
Br.Aplt. at 33-38. He also claims that the trial court summarily rejected the objection 
during the same sidebar. Id. The record belies both assertions. 
The facts here are nearly identical to those in Rosa-Re. In Rosa-Re, defense 
counsel during a sidebar conference said he needed the record "to make a Batson 
challenge," but he then allowed the jury to be sworn and the venire dismissed 
before the objection was argued and denied. 2008 UT 53, ^ 2-4. Following 
conviction, Rosa-Re appealed. Id. at f 5. The court of appeals refused to consider 
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the merits of the Batson claim because it was untimely under Valdez II. Id. On 
certiorari review, this Court reaffirmed Utah's bright line waiver rule, but held that 
it did not apply to Rosa-Re, because Valdez II was not decided before Rosa-Re's trial. 
Id. at Tf 112-15. Significantly, however, in this case, unlike in Rosa-Re, Utah's timely-
raise-or-waive rule was firmly established at the time of Defendant's trial. 
In this case, the parties had just completed exercising their peremptory strikes 
when the trial court asked defense counsel if Defendant passed the jury for cause. 
Defense counsel asked for a sidebar conference, but before approaching the bench, 
confirmed that the defense had no objection to the jury's composition. See Statement 
of the Case at 4-5. 
Although the ensuing sidebar conference was recorded, some words or 
phrases are designated as inaudible. See State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24,113, 69 P.3d 
1278 (reaffirming appellant's duty to provide adequate record for appellate review). 
The existing record, nevertheless, reflects that during the sidebar, defense counsel 
stated only an intention to raise a Batson objection at some point and then 
immediately acquiesced in delaying argument and resolution of the objection until 
after the jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire was dismissed. See 
Statement of the Case at 5. The record also establishes that during the sidebar, the 
court asked the prosecutor only if she had a reason to support the strike, but did not 
ask the prosecutor to articulate those reasons until after the jury was sworn and 
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venire dismissed. Compare R224:29~30 {Add. B), with R224:33 {Add. C). And nothing 
in the existing record suggests that the trial court actually rejected the Batson 
objection during the sidebar conference, especially given the court's subsequent 
invitation to defense counsel to argue the matter. Compare R224:29-30 {Add. B), with 
R224:32~34 {Add. C). 
Even if Defendant was trying to raise a Batson objection during the sidebar 
conference, he failed. As discussed, Batson precludes purposeful discrimination in 
violation of equal protection; consequently, a Batson objection must allege an actual 
intent to discriminate. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,112. Here, defense counsel did not 
allege that the prosecutor intentionally discriminated when she struck Chau. In the 
sidebar conference, defense counsel claimed only that Chau was a minority and, 
therefore, the prosecutor must explain the strike. See Statement of the Case at 5. 
Batson does not impose such a blanket requirement. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 359-60 (1991) (clarifying that only strikes exercised with discriminatory 
intent fall within Batson, but not strikes that produce "a racially disproportionate 
impact"). And although a similarly minimal statement by defense counsel was 
considered "substantively adequate" to raise a Batson objection in Rosa-Re, this 
Court warned that more specific articulation would be required in the future: 
17 
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[G]oing forward, the proponent of a Batson challenge must clearly 
articulate that a Batson objection is being made and that the peremptory 
strike was purposefully used to discriminate on the basis of race or 
gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Rose-Re, 2008 UT 53, f 12 (emphasis in original). 
In any case, even if a Batson objection was articulated in the sidebar 
conference, Defendant waived his initial objection when he simultaneously passed 
the jury for cause and then, before the objection was argued or resolved, allowed the 
jury to be sworn and the remainder of the venire to be dismissed. See Rosa-Re, 2008 
UT 53, If 1344; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44. 
C. Defendant's waiver precludes plain error review. 
Defendant claims that even if he waived his Batson objection, its merits may 
nevertheless be reviewed for plain error. See Br.Aplt. at 38-42. According to 
Defendant, the trial court plainly erred when it did not resolve the Batson objection 
in a timely manner.3 Id. at 40-41. 
As discussed, Utah recognizes that a defendant's failure to timely raise a 
Batson objection and his acquiescence in the trial court's failure to timely resolve the 
objection constitutes "waiver of the original objection/' Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, f^ 14. 
3
 Defendant also claims that the court erred in not entering detailed findings. 
See Br.Aplt. at 25-32. This point is discussed in Point 11(C). 
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Waiver in the context of Batson — like invited error—precludes plain error review 
See Bayless, 201 F.3d at 127 (recognizing that "waiver—whether express or implied" 
precludes appellate review of waived claim); Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f^ 14 (reaffirming 
that invited error precludes plain error review); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 
(Utah 1993) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committed the error."). 
Here, defense counsel's affirmative actions and implicit representations not 
only waived his Batson claim, but also invited any alleged error. See Rosa-Re, 2008 
UT 53, Tf 14 (holding that regardless of trial court's error, defendant has "absolute 
obligation" to actively seek timely resolution of Batson objection). After the parties 
exercised their peremptory strikes, defense counsel affirmatively passed the jury for 
cause, thereby indicating that the defense had no objection to the selected jury's 
4
 Waiver is the "renunciation [of a claim or right] —whether expressly through 
words or implicitly through behavior." United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116,127 
(2nd Cir. 2000). The related concept of invited error occurs when "counsel, either by 
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no 
objection to the proceedings." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14, 128 P.3d 1171 
(citations and internal marks omitted). The invited error doctrine precludes a party 
from "tak[ing] advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial 
court into committing the error." Id. at 15 (internal marks omitted). Rosa-Re relied 
on Winfield's invited error doctrine in clarifying that a defendant's acquiescence in 
delayed resolution of a Batson objection "waives" the objection. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, 
114. 
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composition. Defense counsel next minimally referred to Batson during the sidebar 
conference, but simultaneously agreed that full consideration of the objection could 
be delayed. And when the court subsequently swore the jury and dismissed the 
venire before resolving the objection, defense counsel did not object, but acquiesced 
in the delayed consideration of the objection. See Statement of the Case at 4-6. These 
actions and representations clearly signaled the trial court that Defendant had no 
problem with the composition of the selected jury and no desire to have Chau, the 
stricken juror, reinstated but was interested only in ensuring that "the record was 
clear" that a Batson objection was raised. R224:34. Under the precedent cited above, 
such planted error precludes plain error review. 
D. Defendant's waiver should also preclude his ineffectiveness claim. 
Defendant alternatively claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
waiving the Batson objection. See Br.Aplt at 42-45. Consideration of Defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim would undermine the purpose and policy behind Utah's 
bright-line waiver rule. 
The procedure for resolving a Batson objection is designed to "'encourage[ ] 
prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial 
disruption of the jury selection process/" Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44 (quoting 
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162,172-73 (2005)). "A Batson violation can only be 
remedied without substantially disrupting the jury selection process if it is brought 
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before the venire is dismissed/' Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44. "If a Batson violation is 
found before the venire is dismissed, [it] can be remedied simply by reinstating the 
stricken juror/' Id. But "[o]nce the venire has been dismissed... a sustained Batson 
challenge will require the trial judge" to go to considerable trouble, including 
possibly calling "an entirely new venire . . . [or] declaring a mistrial." Id. As this 
Court noted in Valdez II, there is "no legitimate reason to sanction such an inefficient 
use of judicial time and resources, or to allow such a burden to be imposed on the 
parties." Id. More importantly, as recognized in Valdez II, allowing "a Batson 
challenge to proceed after the venire has been dismissed . . . sanction[s] abuse": 
If such a result were allowed a party would be able to delay raising a 
Batson challenge until it determined whether it approved of the 
selected jury. Such sandbagging is antithetical to notions of judicial 
economy and procedural fairness. 
Id. In short, delay in raising and resolving a Batson objection impermissibly allows a 
defendant to plant error and "test his fortunes with the first jury," only to seek the 
benefit of "a second round in the event of a conviction." Id. at n.22. For these 
reasons, Utah adopted a strict timely-raise-or-waive rule. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, 
1 ! 8 & 14; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, «ff 26 & 43-44, 
Allowing a defendant who has waived a Batson claim to bypass that waiver 
by claiming ineffectiveness on appeal eviscerates this rule. As Valdez II noted, a 
defendant—and hence defense counsel—has every incentive to plant possible 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reversible error by delaying or minimally raising a Batson objection. Indeed, as is 
apparent in this case, a defendant may often have no real interest in the timely 
resolution of a Batson objection because, whatever its resolution, the defendant is 
benefitted. For example, here, the defense expressed satisfaction with the 
composition of the selected jury, allowed that jury to be sworn, and allowed the 
remainder of the venire, including the allegedly improperly stricken juror, to be 
dismissed. In so doing, Defendant and his counsel strategically set up a win-win 
situation. 
If the trial court had considered the untimely Batson objection and granted it, 
mistrial would have been the only available remedy because Chau was no longer 
present and the jury had already been sworn. See Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, Tf 44. A 
mistrial would have presumptively benefitted Defendant by further delaying his 
trial, raising the possibility that Sara, like Amber, might not subsequently appear 
and dismissal be compelled. See Statement of the Case at 7. Conversely, if the 
untimely objection had been denied, as occurred here, trial would simply proceed 
with a jury that Defendant had already selected and approved. But he would now 
have the advantage of possible planted error in an otherwise pristine record. And 
even if the trial court had refused to consider the untimely objection, the trial again 
would have simply proceeded with the jury that Defendant had already selected 
and approved. In sum, unless Defendant affirmatively wanted the allegedly 
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wrongfully stricken juror to serve —which is not the case here because he allowed 
Chau to be dismissed —Defendant faced no disincentive for delaying the Batson 
objection, but for the strict timely-raise-or-waive rule. 
Permitting an ineffectiveness claim eviscerates this disincentive and 
encourages sandbagging. A substantive Batson violation is unlike other errors. 
Under Batson, if an actual equal protection violation is established, automatic 
reversal results without regard to the impact of that violation on the verdict. See 
Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446,1455-56 (2009) (distinguishing between ordinary 
error in loss of peremptory strike and structural error that occurs from actual Batson 
violation); United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952,955-56 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing 
that all federal circuits addressing issue have concluded actual Batson violation 
constitutes structural error); State v. Pliarris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993) 
(recognizing that actual Batson violation requires automatic reversal), cert, denied, 
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant goes farther. He argues that even a procedural error in the 
handling of a Batson objection compels automatic reversal. See Br.Aplt. at 25-32,42 & 
44-45. He claims that if counsel was deficient in waiving the Batson objection, 
prejudice need not be shown because Batson constitutes structural error. See id. at 
44-45. The merits of this argument will be discussed in Point II. But its significance 
here is that it demonstrates the danger of allowing an ineffectiveness claim to 
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supplant Batson waiver: that an otherwise valid conviction could be overturned due 
to counsel's deficient mishandling of a Batson objection, even if no violation of either 
the Fourteenth or Sixth Amendment actually occurred. See Point 11(A). 
In sum, Defendant's waived Batson claim should not be reviewed under either 
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. 
II. 
ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE MERITS ARE CONSIDERED, 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH REVERSIBLE ERROR 
But even if the merits of Defendant's claim are considered, Defendant has not 
established reversible error. Whether the merits are reviewed directly or under 
plain error and counsel ineffectiveness, Defendant at a minimum must establish a 
substantive Batson error. That is, Defendant must establish that his Batson objection 
had merit and thus should or would have been granted, if properly handled. 
A, Defendant must establish a substantive Batson claim to justify 
reversal of his conviction. 
Batson is not violated unless the Fourteenth Amendment is violated, meaning 
that the selected jury is "improperly constituted" in violation of equal protection. 
Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 25. As applied here, equal protection is not violated unless 
the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent in striking Chau solely based on 
race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Accord Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60; Valdez II, 2006 
UT 39, mf 13-15. Proof of a substantive Batson violation mandates automatic 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reversal without a showing that the violation prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
See cases cited, supra, at 23. Consequently, only if Defendant establishes that he 
preserved a meritorious Batson objection and that the trial court erroneously denied 
it, is he entitled to reversal of his conviction. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that he is also entitled to reversal of his 
conviction if he establishes either that the trial court or trial counsel procedurally 
erred in resolving his Batson objection, regardless of the objection's actual merit or 
its impact on the outcome of trial. See Br.Aplt. at 38-45. But even if Defendant 
establishes that the trial court erred and counsel was deficient in their resolution of 
the Batson objection, reversal is not warranted unless Defendant also establishes, at 
minimum, that the mishandled objection had merit—that, but for the procedural 
errors, the objection should and would have been granted.5 
5
 Separate from plain error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not 
fully ruling or entering findings. See Br.Aplt. at 25-32. This argument is addressed 
in Point 11(C). A lack of Batson findings, however, does not compel reversal, but 
only requires a remand for entry of findings. See, e.g.United States v. Rutledge, 648 
F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2011) (remanding for entry of credibility findings, because 
when "an evidentiary gap at step three [exists], the ultimate Batson issue cannot be 
resolved without a remand"); State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, f 17, 41 P.3d 1153 
(remanding for entry of additional Batson findings, where trial court's ruling was 
"both incomplete and conclusory"); Pharris, 846 P.2d at 465 (same); People v. 
Martinez, 740 N.E.2d 1185,1189 (111. App. 2000) (same). A remand is not required if, 
as here, the basis of the trial court's ruling is otherwise apparent from the record. 
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 n.6 (Utah 1991). 
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Plain error requires Defendant to establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/' 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Here, as explained, defense counsel invited any error, 
which precludes plain error review. See discussion, supra, at 18-20. 
To establish that defense counsel was ineffective in inviting error, Defendant 
must: "(i) identify specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard 
of reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or 
omission and under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that 
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for counsel's error, there is a 
reasonable probability" of a more favorable outcome. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington,, 466 U.S. 668,690-91 & 694 (1984)). This prejudice standard 
"is equivalent to the harmfulness test [courts] apply in determining plain error." Id. 
Defendant claims that he does not need to establish prejudice as required 
under Strickland or plain error, because Batson constitutes structural error that 
permits automatic reversal. See Br.Aplt. at 42-44. Thus, he claims that his counsel's 
alleged deficiency in handling of the Batson objection alone justifies reversal of his 
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conviction.6 Id. 
Batson, however, does not require automatic reversal for procedural errors; it 
compels reversal only for substantive equal protection violations. See Hernandez, 500 
U.S. at 359-60. Moreover, unlike the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not protect the fairness of individual verdicts. It protects the fairness of the 
jury selection process. See Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, | 25. Batson itself recognizes that 
even if a jury is discriminatorily selected, that fact alone does not negate the validity 
of the jury's verdict, because a jury's racial composition is wholly irrelevant to a fair 
adjudication of the merits of a case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (reaffirming that "[a] 
person's race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a juror") (citation and internal 
marks omitted). 
Some of the few cases that have addressed Batson in the context of counsel 
ineffectiveness likewise recognize the near impossibility of proving a Batson 
6
 Defendant asserts that it is "obvious" that counsel was deficient in failing to timely 
raise and resolve the Batson objection. See Br.Aplt. at 44. Defendant must prove, 
however, that there is "no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy" for counsel's 
decision. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). See also 
Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53,119,165 P.3d 1195 (recognizing strong presumption 
of competency and effectiveness accorded counsel). Defendant has not met and 
cannot meet this burden, given the reasons why delay benefits a defendant and, 
consequently, may be strategic. See discussion, supra, at 21-23. See also State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  20-21,12 P.3d 92 (recognizing that jury selection is "more 
art than science"). 
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violation affected the outcome of an individual trial, as required under Strickland 
and plain error. See, e.g. Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618.(7th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing conflicting views of how prejudice should be assessed in ineffectiveness 
claim based on Batson violation). Some courts thus allow a defendant to establish 
plain error or counsel's ineffectiveness by demonstrating that the obvious error or 
deficient performance resulted in the denial of a meritorious Batson claim. See, e.g., 
Davidson v. Gengler, 852 F.Supp. 782,787 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (requiring defendant who 
alleges ineffectiveness to show reasonable probability that if Batson objection had 
been made, it" would have been sustained and that the trial judge would have taken 
curative action before the trial began"); In re Commitment of Taylor, 679 N. W.2d 893, 
899-900 (Wis. App. 2004) (same); Pierce v. State, 686 S.E.2d 656, 661 (Ga. 2009) 
(holding that defendant must establish not only "that trial counsel should have 
raised a Batson challenge, but also that the challenge would have been successful"). 
The State does not concede that traditional Strickland prejudice or plain error 
harmfulness is not required. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,147 
(2006) (" [A] violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not 
'complete7 until the defendant is prejudiced."); Batiste v. State, 888 S.W.2d 9,1447 
(Tex. App. 1994) (extensively discussing and concluding that ineffectiveness claim 
based on Batson requires proof of traditional Strickland prejudice). Compare Johnson 
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,466 (1997) (recognizing that plain error predicated on 
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structural error must be analyzed under standard federal 4-part plain error test), 
with State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 18 & n.2, 122 P.3d 543 (recognizing Johnson 
standard, but noting that state plain error analysis is "differs slightly"). 
For purposes of argument, however, the State analyzes the issue under the 
more liberal prejudice standard, which requires Defendant to demonstrate that the 
alleged obvious errors or alleged deficient performance adversely affected the 
outcome of his Batson objection. Under this standard, Defendant still must show 
that his Batson objection had merit and thus should and would have been granted, 
but for the alleged procedural errors. Indeed, without such a requirement, an 
anomaly could result: Defendant's otherwise valid conviction could be reversed 
simply because the court and counsel mishandled a non-meritorious Batson claim. 
See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, \ 26,1 P.3d 546; State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, t 34,989 
P.2d 52; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48,51 (Utah 1998) (all recognizing that ineffective 
assistance cannot be predicated on non-meritorious motion). 
In sum, whether preserved or reviewed under plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel, reversal is not warranted unless Defendant establishes a 
substantive Batson violation. As discussed below, Defendant has not established a 
substantive violation. 
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B. A substantive Batson violation requires proof of discriminatory 
intent. 
As noted, resolution of a Batson objection is a three-Step process. "[OJnce the 
opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the 
strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race- neutral 
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the 
opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination." Purkett v. Elem, 
514 U.S. 765,767 (1995). Accord State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 17,994 P.2d 177; State v. 
Higginbotliam, 917 P.2d 545,547 (Utah 1996). The analysis is identical to that used in 
employment discrimination cases. See Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 14. And "[a]s in any 
equal protection case, the burden is, of course, on the defendant who alleges 
discriminatory selection of the venire to prove the existence of purposeful 
discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (citation and internal marks omitted). 
1. Step one: the prima facie showing. 
Step one of Batson analysis requires the opponent of the strike —here 
Defendant—to show that "the totality of the relevant facts" supports an inference of 
purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 18; 
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450,455 (Utah 1994). Merely alleging that a minority was 
struck is insufficient; rather, Defendant must demonstrate "a strong likelihood" that 
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the prosecutor purposefully discriminated in striking Chau solely based on his race. 
See Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457-58. 
Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing either in the sidebar 
conference or in his subsequent argument. Counsel did not allege that the 
prosecutor purposefully discriminated. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, If 12. He alleged 
only that because Chau was a minority and counsel could discern no reason for his 
strike, an explanation was required. See Statement oftlie Case at 5-7. Normally, a 
lack of a prima facie showing justifies termination of the Batson inquiry; but in this 
case, the prima facie requirement became moot once the prosecutor explained her 
strike (step two). See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359; Colwell, 2000 UT 8, t 18. 
Nevertheless, weakness in the prima facie showing may be considered in evaluating 
the trial court's ultimate denial of the Batson objection (step three). See Hernandez, 
500 U.S. at 369-70. 
2. Step two: the explanation for the strike. 
Step two of Batson analysis requires the proponent of the strike —here the 
prosecutor — to provide a facially neutral explanation for the strike. See Purkett, 514 
U.S. at 768-69. A general denial of discriminatory purpose is insufficient. See id. at 
769. But see Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 & n.6 (recognizing that even when "a frivolous 
or utterly nonsensical justification" or no explanation is offered, Batson inquiry still 
proceeds to step three). The explanation should be "clear and reasonably specific" 
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and "related to the [prosecutor's] view concerning the . . . case to be tried." Batson, 
476 U.S. at 89, 98 n.20. "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 
prosecutor's explanation," the explanation is considered facially neutral as a matter 
of law. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. 
The prosecutor's explanation, however, need not be persuasive or even 
plausible in step two. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768; Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Rather the 
credibility and validity of the explanation is considered only in step three, when the 
trial court ultimately rules: 
[In step three] implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably 
will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say 
that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at 
step three is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate 
the inquiry at step two when the race-neutral reason is silly or 
superstitious. The latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden 
of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests and never 
shifts from the opponent of the strike. 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (emphasis in original). Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1f 22. 
Here, the prosecutor offered a clear and reasonably specific explanation that 
was related directly to this case. The prosecutor explained that she struck Chau 
because he was inattentive. She explained that she had first noticed that Chau 
looked at her "funny" several times, but did not decide to strike him until she 
observed him "putting his head down" and not listening to the judge when the 
judge was reading the jury article to the venire. The prosecutor had considered 
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striking Juror Bunting, but ultimately decided to strike Chau because Bunting was 
paying attention to the judge, but Chau was not. The prosecutor felt that a juror 
needed to be fully attentive during court proceedings. See Statement oftlie Case at 6. 
See United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2nd Cir. 1990) (recognizing that 
prosecutor's "concern about a juror's inattentiveness is a good reason for its 
exercising a peremptory challenge"); United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211,214 (5th 
Cir. 1990) ("Intuitive assumptions about a potential juror's interest and attitudes can 
be acceptable as a neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge."); and United 
States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904,913 (10th Cir. 1993) (affirming that juror inattentiveness 
is widely recognized as facially race-neutral explanation for strike). 
3. Step three: the trial court's ruling. 
Step three of the Batson analysis requires the trial court to determine if the 
defendant carried his burden to prove that the prosecutor exercised the challenged 
strike solely for a discriminatory purpose. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. In this final 
step, the trial court determines if the prosecutor's "explanation for a peremptory 
challenge should be believed." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. An explanation may be 
credited, even if it is in fact mistaken. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3. 
In determining whether a defendant carried his burden to prove 
discriminatory intent, the trial court should "undertake a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Batson, 476 U.S. at 
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93; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. Often, however, the trial court's assessment is based 
on "little evidence" other than the credibility of the prosecutor. See Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (reaffirming that "[t]he credibility of the 
prosecutor's explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis [and] 
once that has been settled, there seems nothing left [for.an appellate] court to 
review"). Consequently, if a defendant—as Defendant did here— fails to attack the 
credibility of an explanation after it has been offered, the trial court may assume that 
the defendant concedes the legitimacy of the strike and is abandoning his initial 
Batson claim. See Texas Dept. ofComm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,255-56 (1981); 
Univ. of Utah v. Indus. Comrn. of Utah, 736 P.2d 630,625 (Utah 1987) (both recognizing 
that once neutral explanation for alleged discriminatory act provided, party 
claiming discriminatory intent must disprove explanation's validity). See also Rudas, 
905 F.2d at 41 (recognizing trial court may assume defense counsel acquiesced in 
legitimacy of prosecutor's explanation for strike, where counsel failed to actively 
seek ruling or other action after explanation was given); Davis v. Baltimore Gas & 
Elec. Co., 160 F.3d 1023,1027-28 (4th Cir. 1998) (adopting position of Second and 
Eighth Circuits that failure to directly challenge neutral explanation waives or 
abandons Batson claim); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123,1126-27 (5th Cir. 1993) { 
(same); State v. Washington, 288 S.W.3d 312,316-318 (Mo. App. 2009) (holding that 
defendant's failure to challenge prosecutor's explanation ended Batson inquiry and < 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court not obligated to rule); State v. Jones, 911 P.2d 891, 898 (N.M. App. 1995) 
(recognizing that because defendant did not challenge veracity of prosecutor's 
explanation, court may "reasonably conclude that Defendant did not carry his 
burden of proof" under Batson). See also State v. Owen, 935 P.2d 183,196 (Idaho App. 
1997) (recognizing defendant waived pretext claim where he failed to attack 
prosecutor's explanation in trial court). 
C. Defendant fails to establish a substantive Batson violation. 
The trial court did not explicitly deny Defendant's Batson objection or any 
specific findings. Although trial courts should be explicit when ruling, in this case, 
the facts are so simple and the legitimacy of the strike so apparent that any explicit 
ruling would be minimal at best. 
Chau, a Utah native of apparent Asian ancestry, was stricken from the venire 
by the prosecutor's third peremptory strike. Defense counsel then passed the jury 
for cause, but indicated that he would like to raise a Batson objection at some point. 
Without objection, the court delayed argument on the objection and instead swore 
the jury and dismissed Chau and the remainder of the venire. When the objection 
was finally argued, defense counsel did not claim that the prosecutor had 
intentionally discriminated in striking Chau, but claimed that because Chau was a 
minority and counsel could not discern an apparent reason for the strike, the 
prosecutor needed to explain it. The prosecutor responded that she noticed that 
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Chau had looked at her "funny" several times, but that she had planned on leaving 
him on the jury until she observed him not paying attention when the court was 
reading to the venire. The prosecutor further described what she had observed: 
Chau "kept putting his head down, he wasn't listening and that concerns me when 
someone doesn't want to pay attention." See Statement of tire Case at 6. 
After this explanation, the court asked defense counsel if there was 
"[a]nything else that we need to put on the record?" Defense counsel did not 
request that the court take any further action, but opined that the prosecutor's 
explanation was not "sufficient," because other reasons might explain Chau's 
reactions: 
[Ijt's hard for somebody to tell if somebody is paying attention. People 
have different ways of paying attention and this is a smaller room 
(inaudible) reading to them or talking to them and so that fact that 
someone is looking around or something, I don't think is necessarily 
they're not paying attention. 
R224:34. The court then allowed trial to continue with the jury previously selected 
and approved by the parties. See Statement of the Case at 7. 
Defense counsel's response did not deny the prosecutor's observations, but 
claimed that the uncontested behavior might not be the result of inattentiveness. 
Given the prosecutor's explanation and counsel's response, it is implicit that the 
court found that no discriminatory intent had been established. This is especially 
true where defense counsel's lack of responsive challenge suggested that counsel 
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recognized the legitimacy of the prosecutor's explanation, even if counsel disagreed 
with the prosecutor's inference; or suggested that counsel was abandoning the 
Baison claim after hearing the prosecutor's explanation. See cases cited, supra, at 34-
35. 
For the first time on appeal, Defendant contends that the prosecutor's 
explanation could not be credited, because it was inherently racial. See Br.Aplt. at 
15-17. He also claims, for the first time, that all demeanor-based explanations must 
be corroborated on the record. Id. at 25 & 29. Because these claims were not raised 
below, they should be summarily rejected. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, \ 45,114 
P.3d 551. In any case, they lack merit. 
In support of the first argument, Defendant cites to an article discussing 
possible mistaken impressions that may arise from cultural differences. See Br.Aplt. 
at 15-19. The article states that Asians are culturally conditioned to avoid eye 
contact as a sign of respect, which non-Asians may misinterpret as inattentiveness. 
Id. at 16-17. Defendant claims this proves that the prosecutor's explanation was 
racially based. Id. To the contrary, it supports the reasonableness of the 
prosecutor's interpretation of Chau's reactions, even if that interpretation might not 
in fact be true. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3. Notably, Defendant's 
argument is itself stereotypical, in that he presumes that if Chau was of Asian 
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ancestry, he was necessarily exhibiting a cultural " Asian" response in putting his 
head down. But Chau was born and raised in Utah. 
Defendant's second argument similarly lacks merit. Defendant claims that 
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), precludes crediting a demeanor-based 
explanation unless it is corroborated on the record and a specific finding entered. 
See Br.Aplt. at 29-30. Defendant overreads Snyder. The Court in Snyder would have 
credited the demeanor-based explanation, if it had been clear that the trial court had 
credited it. 552 U.S. at 477. The difficulty was that the prosecutor offered two 
explanations — one demeanor-based and one not—that were both actively contested 
by defense counsel, but neither of which was explicitly credited by the trial court. 
Id. at 478-81. After the Snyder Court found that the non-demeanor explanation was 
negated by the record and rejected it as a pretext, the Court could not affirm based 
on the remaining demeanor-based explanation without knowing if the trial court 
had credited it. Id. at 482,485. 
The narrowness of Snyder's holding was subsequently recognized in Thaler 
v.Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171,1174-75 (2010), a case Defendant fails to acknowledge. In 
Thaler, the Court concluded that no corroboration was necessary to credit a 
demeanor-based explanation, because the prosecutor's credibility alone was 
sufficient. Id. at 1175. Although many cases caution trial courts to carefully assess a 
proffered demeanor-based explanation to ensure that it is not a subterfuge for 
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discrimination, these same decisions recognize that, on appeal, the trial court's 
credibility assessment is unassailable absent clear error.7 See, e.g., Johnson, 4 F.3d at 
913 (cautioning trial courts to carefully scrutinize demeanor-based explanations, but 
recognizing that trial courts' assessments will be upheld unless "clearly erroneous"); 
United States v.Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393,395 (8th Cir. 1991) (same). 
In any case, defense counsel did not contest the prosecutor's observation of 
Chau. Counsel claimed only that the inference the prosecutor drew from this 
observation—that Chau was inattentive — was not the only inference possible. See 
Statement of the Case at 7. Batson, however, does not require that the prosecutor's 
inference be the only possible inference, or even a correct inference. See 
Higginbotham, 971 P.2d at 549 n.3. Batson requires only that prosecutor's explanation 
be creditable, either standing alone or based on the prosecutor's own credibility. 
Thaler, 130 S. Ct. at 1175. Because defense counsel did not challenge either the 
credibility of the prosecutor or the inherent legitimacy of the explanation, the trial 
7
 Defendant also relies on Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 2003), for the 
proposition that corroboration is required for a demeanor-based explanation before 
it may be credited. See Br.Aplt. at 21-23. Dorsey, however, predates Thaler. More 
significantly, Dorsey7s rule applies only if the defendant challenged the "factual basis 
for the explanation." Dorsey, 868 So.2d at 1196. If the explanation is not challenged, 
the demeanor-based explanation is presumed "genuine." Id. at 1199. Accord Harriell 
v. State, 29 So.3d 372,374 (Fla. App. 2010). See also Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 
644, 648 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing explanation based on described physical 
behavior is more easily credited than vague assertions, such as "I just got a feeling"). 
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court could permissibly assume that Defendant was conceding the point or 
otherwise abandoning his original objection. See cases, supra, at 34-35. This is 
especially true where despite the court asking counsel if it needed to do "anything 
else on the record/' counsel did not request an explicit ruling or findings. See id. 
Moreover, contrary to defense counsel's assertion, the issue to be resolved in 
the third step of the Batson analysis is not whether the prosecutor produced a 
"sufficient" explanation, but whether Defendant carried his burden to prove that the 
prosecutor acted with actual discriminatory intent. See cases, supra, at 24 & 33-35. 
Here, Defendant's prima facie showing was so weak—a mere assertion that Chau 
was a minority and, consequently, the strike needed to be explained — that even if 
the prosecutor had produced no explanation, the trial court could still have 
legitimately found that Defendant failed to prove purposeful discrimination. Cf. 
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 n.6 (recognizing that explanation or lack of explanation is 
but one factor to be considered in ultimately ruling). 
In sum, whatever alleged procedural defects might exist in this case, no 
violation of equal protection in fact occurred. Defendant, therefore, has not 
established that if the alleged procedural defense had not occurred, his Batson 
would have been successful. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted January ^^-2012. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
&v^  
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH; OCTOBER 28, 200 9 
JUDGE TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning. Welcome to Third 
District Court. My name is Terry Christiansen, I'll be the 
judge presiding in this case. I'm sorry to get such a slow 
start. Normally we have 90 plus percent of jurors that 
appear but today we had nine out of 30 that didn't show up so 
we've been waiting hoping we'd have enough jurors to proceed 
and hopefully we will. 
. This is the matter of State of Utah vs. Antoine 
Darnell Harris. It is a criminal case. The case number is 
081400099. 
Is the State ready to proceed, Ms. Serassio? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is the defense ready to proceed, Mr. 
McCaughey? . 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I am.' 
THE COURT: What I'm going to do is have each of 
you stand, raise your right hand, I'll have my clerk swear 
you in as prospective jurors. 
(Prospective jurors sworn) 
/THE COURT: Be seated. I'm going to ask just a few 
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to make sure you all 
each of you citizens of the United 
qualify as jurors. 
States and over the 
of 18? If you are not, please raise your hand.. The 






record will re 
Do each 
, body and dis 
of you read, speak, and understand the 
If you do not again 
will reflect that no 
L of you residents of 
r please raise your 
hands are raised. 
Salt Lake County at 
If you are not, please raise you hand. 
.fleet that no hands are raised. 
of you consider yourself to be of sound 
cretion? If you have any concerns in those 
areas, again, please raise your hand. The record will 
reflect that no hands are raised. 
Have any of you been convicted of a felony or 
malfeasance in office? If so, please raise your hand. The 
record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
And finally, are any of you in the active military 
service at the present time? If so, please raise your hand. 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Both counsel stipulate as to the general 
qualifications and competence of the panel? Ms. Serassio? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: We do, Your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. We're going to start with 
2 Mr. Johnson. I'm going to have you stand. I think you 
3 should - yeah, just go through that list and tell us a little 
4 bit about yourself. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: Okay, my name is Ralph Johnson. My 
6 age is 54 and I've gone through high school, graduated high 
7 school. My occupation is (inaudible) technician. I am 
8 married. My spouse's name is Brenda and her occupation is a 
9 house - homemaker. I live in Sandy and I've lived in Salt 
10 Lake County all my life and number of children, I have two. 
11 My son is 26 and my daughter is 35. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
13 Next is Ms. Ritter. 
14 MS. RITTER: My name is Jane Ritter. My age is 80. 
15 I have been educated in Ohio, high school, attended Ohio 
16 I State University. I'm a retired travel agent. I am a widow. 
17 Spouse name and occupation doesn't seen particularly 
18 relevant. However, my spouse was a member of the military. 
19 I am a resident of the area. I've lived in Salt Lake County 
20 probably 30 years. I have five children, one is dead. Their 
21 ages start at 58 and decrease from there to 50. Is that 
22 close enough? 
23 THE COURT: That's close enough. Thank you. 
24 MS. RITTER: And also, would you turn up the 
25 microphone. I don't hear real well. 
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THE COURT: I don't know that we can turn it up but 
we'll do the best we can. 
MS. RITTER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Chow. 
MR. CHOW: My name is (inaudible) Chow. I'm 27. I 
graduated high school. I'm still going to school up at the U. 
Occupation is still student. I'm single. I live in the Salt 
Lake area. I was actually born and raised in Salt Lake so 
I've lived here all my life and I have no kids. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Bunting. 
MS. BUNTING: My name is Lamoy Bunting. I'm 78 
years old. I graduated from high school and one year of 
college I am a homemaker. I am married. My husband 
retired. Robert is my husband's name and he worked for US 
West. I live in Midvale and have lived in the county a good 
portion of my life. I have four daughters, oldest one 55 on 
down to the youngest at 42. 
THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. 
Next is Ms. Price. 
MS. PRICE: My name is Heather Price. I'm 28 years 
old. I have some college. I work for an insurance company. 
I am married to Thomas Price. He works up as the University 
of Utah in the kitchen. I live in Murray and have lived 
there my entire life. I have one son and he's 12. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Merkley. 
MR. MERKLEY: My name is Robert Merkley. I'm 50 
years old. I have some college education. I'm a business 
owner of an engineering, structural engineering company. I 
am married. My spouse's name is Jennifer Merkley. She is a 
homemaker. I live in Holladay. I have resided in Salt Lake 
County for 2 9 years. We have four children ranging from 2 8 
years of age to 14. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Fulmer. 
MR. FULLMER: My name is Jason Fullmer. I'm 33. I 
have a bachelor's degree. My occupation is software 
engineer. I'm married to Andrea and she stays at home. I 
live in West Jordan and I've been in Salt Lake County my 
whole life and I have three children, ages nine, seven and 
five. 
THE COURT: Thank you.' 
Let's go to the top row. We'll start with Mr. 
Ludlow. 
MR. LUDLOW: My name is Jason Ludlow. I'm 4 0 years 
old. I work in construction. I have a little bit of college 
education. I'm single. I've lived in Salt Lake County my 
whole life and I have no kids. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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Next is Mr. Maylen. 
MR. MAYLEN: My name is Kent Maylen. I'm age 56. 
I've attended UTC and the University of Utah. I'm a custom 
frame builder. I'm single. I've lived in Salt Lake County 
most of my life and I have a daughter aged 35. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Ms. Van Rosendahl. 
MS. VAN ROSENDAHL: My name is Kathryn Van 
Rosendahl. I'm 25. I have my associates, I'm working on my 
bachelor's. I'm a legal assistant and a waitress, single. I 
live in Sugarhouse and I've lived there all 25 years and I 
have no kids. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, where do you work as a legal 
assistant? 
MS. VANROSENDAHL: Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall, 
McCarthy. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Norman. 
MR. NORMAN: I'm - go by Bret Norman. I'm 54. I 
had a year of technical college but I'm a Wonder Bread 
salesman and have been for about 30 years; married to a 
wonderful girl named Tina and she's a secretary. I live in 
Glendale and I've been in Utah for about 40 years. I have 
one son whose 36. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
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70. 
Next is Mr. Carpenter. 
MR. CARPENTER: My name is David Carpenter. 
I have a graduate degree. I am retired customer 
I am 
service 
agent from Delta Airlines. I am single. I have been living 
in Salt Lake County for 23 years. I have no children. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Perry. 
MR. PERRY: My name is Jeff Perry. I am 33 years 
old. I have roughly three years of college. I am in sales 
for a snowboarding shop. I am married to a girl named 
Breanna. Her occupation is flight attendant for Sky West 
Airlines. I live kind of in that Millcreek/Murray/South Salt 
Lake area. I've been in Utah for about 13 years in Salt Lake 
off and on for that time, no children. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Next is Mr. Smith. 
MR. SMITH: My name is Sean Smith - sorry my voice 
is giving out. 
THE COURT: You're fine. 
MR. SMITH: I'm 22. I graduated high school and . 
attended college. I'm an employee, I'm single. I live in 
Sugarhouse. I've lived here for three years. I have no 
children. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. . 
All right. Let's so to the back of the courtroom 
and we'll start with Mr. Berg. 
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MR. BERG: My name is Steven Berg/ I'm'47. I have 
a bachelor's in (inaudible) technology. I am married. My 
wife's name is Stacey and she's a medical assistant. I 
reside in Riverton area, lived in Salt Lake County 20 years. 
I have two children, a 23 year old daughter and 19 year old 
son. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Next is Mr. Campbell. 
MR. CAMPBELL: My name is David Campbell. My age 
is 81, four years of college. I have a manufacturing firm 
from which I'm retired. My son is now running that. I'm 
married. My wife's name is Mary Elizabeth. I've been in the 
area for 40 some odd years. I have seven children, 24 
grandchildren, and 14 great grandchildren. 
THE COURT: Good for you. Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Stevenson. 
MR. STEVENSON: I'm Justin Stevenson. I am 29 
years old. I graduated from the University of Utah. I 
manage bank owned properties right now. I am single and I've 
lived in Sugarhouse for about three years now and I have no 
k i d s . . . - • • • • 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next Mr. Brown. 
MR. BROWN: My name is Richard Brown. I'm 55 years 
old. I have a 4-year degree. I'm a registered nurse. I'm 
divorced. I'm a registered nurse. I've been in the area for 
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18 years. I have one child, 24 years old. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
Next is Mr. Cressor. 
MR. CRESSOR: My name is Chad Cressor. I'm 31. I 
have a high school diploma. I work for a manufacturing 
company. I'm married to Misha Cressor. She works for a 
title company. I'm a resident of Sandy for nine years. I 
have two children 11 and 4. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Day? 
MR. DAY: My name is James Day. I am 60 years of 
age. I hold a bachelor's and master's degree from the 
University of Utah. I'm a registered architect in the State 
of Utah. I'm married to Kathryn Day. She is a homemaker. 
We live in Sandy and we've lived in Salt Lake County for the 
last 18 years. Prior to that we were in Pasadena, 
California. I have four children and one grandchild. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
And finally, Mr. Nielsen? 
MR. NIELSEN: Yeah, my name is Pete Nielsen. I'm 
49 years old. I graduated from the University of Utah with a 
BS degree. Currently I own a residential housecleaning 
business. I'm not married. Currently I live in Riverton. 
Lived in Salt Lake County most of my life. No kids. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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All right. I've going to read the salient part of 
the information which is the charging document in this case. 
It read as follows: 
"State of Utah vs. Antoine Darnell Harris. The 
undersigned, Detective Ann Valencia, Taylorsville City Police 
Department upon written affidavit states on information and 
belief that the defendant committed the crimes of Count 1, 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony at 125 West 
Clubhouse Drive in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or 
about December 18, 2007 in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 103, Utah Code, in that the defendant, Antoine 
Darnell Harris, a party to the offense, did assault Sarah 
Michel as defined in Utah Code 76-5-102 and used other means 
or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." 
Count 2 is Assault, Domestic Violence, a Class B 
Misdemeanor Felony, at 1275 West Clubhouse Drive in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on or about December 18, 2007 in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102 and Title 77, 
Chapter 37, Section 1 of the Utah Code, in that the 
defendant, Antoine Darnell Harris, a party to the offense did 
assault another with unlawful force or violence to do bodily 
injury, then threatened accompanied by a show of immediate 
show force or violence to do bodily injury or did commit an 
act with unlawful force or violence that caused bodily injury 
and furthermore, the defendant and the victim were co-
10 
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habitants." 
To those two counts the defendant has entered pleas 
of. not guilty. 
This case should be completed today. I would 
anticipate that the evidence should be finished sometime mid-
afternoon and we would read the jury instructions, do closing 
arguments and hopefully you'd have it by mid to late 
afternoon for your deliberations. Are there any of you 
because of pressing family or business matters cannot devote 
your full time and attention to this case if you were 
selected to serve on the jury? If any of you could not 
devote your full time and attention, please raise your hand. 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
I know that Mr. Ritter indicated that she hearing 
issues. Are there any others that have any physical ailments 
that would prevent you from serving on the jury? These could 
be things such as a recent surgery, back problems, eye 
problems, hearing problems. Anyone other that Ms. Ritter? 
If so, please raise your hand. The record will reflect that 
no hands are raised. 
Ms. Ritter have you been able to hear me okay? 
MS. RITTER: I can hear you pretty well. 
THE COURT: If you were selected on the jury in 
this case and I had you sit in the seat closest to the 
witness box, do you think you'd be able to hear okay? 
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as given to you by the Court regardless of what you believe 
the law is or ought to be? If you could not accept the 
statements of law given to you by the Court, please raise 
your hand. The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Do you any of you know anything about this case 
other than having simply listened to the information being 
read? If so, please raise your hand. The record will 
reflect that no hands are raised. 
Ms. Serassio, if you'd stand, identify yourself and 
any witnesses you anticipate calling today. 
MS. SERASSIO: Thank you, Your Honor. 
My name is Melanie Serassio. I am a Deputy 
District Attorney with the Salt Lake County District 
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Attorney's Office. Witnesses that I have present today are 
Officer Valencia from Taylorsville Police Department, Officer 
Cooper from Taylorsville Police Department, Sarah Michel is a 
witness in this case. I also have Dr. Lori Frasier coming to 
testify today. She works with the Primary Children's Medical 
Center. There are two other people involved in this case who 
will not be present to testify today but I want to identify 
them so that you know them, Michael Eckhart and Amber Wardle. 
THE COURT: Do any of you know Ms. Serassio or the 
witnesses she has identified? If so, please raise your hand? 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Mr. McCaughey, if you'd stand and identify 
yourself, your client, and any witnesses you anticipate 
calling today. 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Your Honor, I am Steve McCaughey 
and I practice law here in Salt Lake. Antoine Harris is my 
client and he will be the only witness we anticipate. 
THE COURT: All right. Do any of you know Mr. 
Mcaughey or Mr. Harris? If so, please raise your hand. 
Again the record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Have any of you served on a jury before? If so, 
please raise your hand. All right, let's start on the first 
row with Mr. Johnson. 
Mr. Johnson, how long ago and what type of case? 
MR. JOHNSON: It was probably about 15 years ago 
13 
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and it was a drug related (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Do you remember what the verdict was in 
the case, guilty or not guilty? 
MR. JOHNSON: It was not guilty. 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: What kind of case was it? 
THE COURT: It was a drug case. 
Anyone else in the first row? All right, the back 
row, Mr. Ludlow. 
MR. LUDLOW: It was probably about 15 years ago. 
It was a child abuse case. 
THE COURT: And do you remember the verdict in the 
case? 
MR. LUDLOW: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Any else in the top row? All right. 
And then the back, I know we had Mr. Brown. 
MR. BROWN: Yes, it was a DUI case about five years 
ago. 
THE COURT: And do you remember the verdict in the 
case? 
MR. BROWN: It was guilty. 
THE COURT: Anyone else in the back row? It's Mr. 
Day - I'm sorry, Mr. Cressor. 
MR. DAY: Mr. Day. 
THE COURT: Oh, Day, okay. 
MR. DAY: It was a case in this court about two or 
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three years ago. I do not recall the charges or anything. I 
recollect I believe the verdict was guilty. 
THE COURT: Anyone else that has served on a jury? 
Those of you that have answered in the affirmative, do you 
believe that you could be fair and impartial in this case and 
simply base the evidence - or base your decision on the 
evidence presented in this case and this case alone? If any 
of you would have difficulty being fair and impartial based 
on prior jury service, please raise your hand. The record 
will reflect that no hands are raised. 
It is the duty of the Judge, not the jury to 
determine punishment in the event the defendant is found 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Are there any of you who 
could not set aside the issue of punishment in your 
deliberations and base your decision of guilt or innocens'e 
solely on the facts presented? If any of your would let the 
issue of punishment affect your deliberation, please raise 
your hand. Again, the record will reflect that no hands are 
raised. 
Have any of you formed an opinion as to the guilt 
or innocense of Mr. Harris or which party should prevail in 
this case? If so, please raise your hand. The record will 
reflect that no hands are raised. 
Have any of you been charged with the crime of 
assault, either simple assault or aggravated assault? If so, 
15 
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1 please raise your hand. The record will reflect that no 
2 hands are raised. 
3 Do any of you have any close family members that 
4 have been charged with a crime of assault or aggravated 
5 assault? If so, please raise your hand. We've got a couple. 
6 Ms. Price, and who is it that was charged? 
7 MS. PRICE: My father was. 
8 THE COURT: And how long ago was that? 
9 MS. PRICE: It was a number of years ago. I don't 
10 know how long. He's deceased. He died a couple of months 
11 ago. 
12 THE COURT: The fact that your father was charged 
13 with a similar offense, would that cause you any concern 
14 about your ability to be fair and impartial in this case? 
15 MS. PRICE: No. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. I saw some other hands. Over 
17 here? Anyone else? Mr. Day. 
18 MR. DAY: I have a daughter that was charged with 
19 domestic violence approximately two years ago. 
20 THE COURT: And would that fact have any bearing on 
21 your ability to be fair and impartial in this case? 
22 • • MR. DAY: No, sir. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Anyone else who has had a 
24 close family member that was charged with assault or 
25 aggravated assault? The record will reflect that no hands 
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1 are raised. 
2 Have any of you been the victim of an assault, 
3 either domestic violence related or non-domestic violence? 
4 If so, please raise your hand. 
5 All right. Ms. Price, we'll start with you. How 
6 long ago? 
7 . MS. PRICE: My ex-husband, five years ago. It was 
8 (inaudible) and get a restraining order against him but I 
9 never did. 
10 THE COURT: All right. The fact that you have been 
11 the victim of an assault and this case does involve issues of 
12 assault, would that give you some concern about your ability 
13 to be fair and impartial? 
•14 - MS. PRICE: It kind of would, yeah. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, and that's why we ask the 
16 question. So I appreciate your candor. Thank you, Ms. 
17 Price. 
18 All right. We also have another hand I believe in 
19 the jury box. That's Mr. Perry. 
20 MR. PERRY: I was car-jacked and assaulted in 
21 I Minneapolis about 15 years, no, it would been 15 years ago. 
22 THE COURT: All right. This case will be a lot 
23 different than that. This involves a domestic situation. 
24 Would the fact that were a victim however of assault, would 
25 that give you any concern about your ability to be fair and 
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impartial? 
MR. PERRY: No. 
THE COURT: Anyone else in the jury box? All 
right, let's go to the back of the room. Anyone that's been 
the victim of assault? The record will reflect that no hands 
are raised. 
Do any.of you have any close family members that 
have been the victim of an assault? If so, please raise your 
hand. All right, that's Ms. Ritter. 
MS. RITTER: My daughter. 
THE COURT: And how long ago was that? 
MS. RITTER: Three days ago. 
THE COURT: Would that you concern about your 
ability to be fair and impartial? 
MS. RITTER: I hope not. 
THE COURT: I know these are hard things to look 
into your mind and try to anticipate what the evidence would 
be. The purpose of this voir dire selection process is to 
get jurors that can be completely fair and impartial. I know 
that it's difficult to kind of separate what happens in your 
private life when you come into court and sit on a jury but 
if you have any concern that, for example, your daughter's 
situation, you might relate that to this situation and 
somehow it would affect your decision then it's better that 
you not serve on this case and serve on another one. With 
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that in mind, do you have any concerns about your ability to 
be fair and impartial? 
MS. RITTER: I think I could be fair. 
THE COURT: Any question in your mind? 
MS. RITTER: Yeah, there is, there has to be. 
THE COURT: And that's why we ask the question and 
I appreciate your candor. 
Anyone else? All right. That's Mr. Berg. 
MR. BERG: My daughter while she was in high school 
(inaudible) assault from (inaudible). 
. THE COURT: And how long ago was that? 
MR. BERG: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Would that situation have any bearing 
on your ability to be fair and impartial in this case? 
MR. BERG: No. 
THE COURT: Anyone else whose had a family member 
that's been the victim of an assault situation. 
• Mr. Day? . 
MR. DAY: Same one. 
. THE COURT: And that would have no bearing? 
MR. DAY: No.. 
THE COURT: All right. Obviously Ms. Serassio has 
identified to police officers who will testify. The law and 
direction from the Court is that you should consider the 
testimony of a law enforcement the same as you would consider 
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the testimony of any other witness. In other words, you 
should give the testimony of a peace officer no greater or 
lesser weight simply because of the position that they hold. 
You should consider their testimony the same as you would the 
testimony of any other witness. It could be a housewife, a 
teacher, a doctor, a salesman. It just simply doesn't 
matter. You have to judge their testimony as you would any. 
other witness. 
Obviously sometimes in people's experiences they 
have had either negative or positive experience with law 
enforcement officers to the point that they would give either 
greater or lesser weight to their testimony. Do any of you 
feel that because of your experiences you would give either 
greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a witness simply 
because they hold the position of a peace officer? If so, 
please raise your hand. The record will reflect that no 
hands are raised. 
A couple of general questions. If you were a • 
party, either the State of Utah or Mr. Harris, would you be 
fully satisfied to have your case tried by a person of your 
present attitude, and frame of mind toward the case and that 
can be for any reason, you don't need to say it in front of 
everyone else. But is there anyone that has concerns in that 
area about if you were the State or the defendant about 
having your case tried by someone of your present attitude 
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and frame of mind? If you would have those concerns, please 
raise your hand. The record will reflect that no hands are 
raised. 
Do any of you have any personal considerations or 
concerns that may interfere with your ability to objectively 
sit and hear the evidence to be presented or to fairly and 
impartially consider the evidence, deliberate and render a 
verdict in this case? If you have any personal . 
considerations or concerns, again, we can discuss those at 
the bench, but if you have those, please raise your hand. 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
If you are selected to serve on this jury you will 
be called to sit in judgment of Mr. Harris. There is an old 
adage in Christian Law and Christianity and in the Bible that 
says something to the effect, judge not that ye be not 
judged. In this case you will take an oath to sit in 
judgment if you are selected on the jury. Are there any of 
your who would be uncomfortable and feel that you simply 
could not sit in judgment if called to serve on this jury? 
If so, please raise your hand. The record will reflect that 
no hands are raised. 
Counsel, please approach. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: Any questions I need to ask 
(inaudible)? 
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MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Obviously Ms. Price and Ms. Ritter. 
Anybody else? 
MR. (?) : Mr. Berg (inaudible) ask him questions 
[inaudible]. 
THE COURT: He said it was when she was in high 
school and it was just a boyfriend/girlfriend (inaudible). 
MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I'll strike Ritter and Price. Let me 
do that right now and (inaudible). 
MR. (?):. (Inaudible). 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: All right. That concludes the voir 
dire. I'm going to have the attorneys exercise their 
peremptory challenges. 
While they're doing so,-rather than just simply 
have you do nothing, I came across an article many, many 
years ago. It's by Barbara Holland, j S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S 
WiSlW^ I'll read you excerpts from that 
article while we're waiting for the attorneys to exercise 
their challenges. 
It read as follows: "When law and order began, the 
only court was the head of the family and father knew best. 
His word was the law and there was no appeal. If papa was a 
bully, maybe momma could pack up the kids and move to a . 
' 22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
different family or spike his soup with leaves and berries 
her mother had told her about. In any case, what happened in 
the family was nobody's business but the family's. Presently 
people developed agricultural and settled down, clustering 
together in groups of families. We acquired garden plots and 
portable private property and controversy as we now know it 
was born. Old (inaudible) still decided family matters but 
coping with inner familiar strife called for group 
arbitration to prevent a homicidal free-for-all. Controversy 
gave birth to law. Rome refined the system and separated the 
law from the facts. A magistrate to find the dispute, cited 
the law and referred the problem to citizen (inaudible), a 
fellow of some standing who called in a few associates to 
help. They listened to the speeches, weighed the evidence 
and pronounced sentence. This was more orderly than a' 
Tribunal. The Romans were passionately fond of order and 
wrote down all their laws in books. They were also fond of a 
good public spectacle and a convicted criminal could opt for 
the arena and entertain citizens by duking it out with other 
criminals or prisoners of war. A talented gladiator only got 
to live but he could wind up as a popular sports hero 
surrounded by pretty ladies. The Romans loved a winner 
regardless of his criminal record. 
After Rome fell apart it's orderly laws 
deteriorated to gibberish and threatened the possible 
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legendary King Arthur had to send his possible legendary 
knights out to ride around righting wrongs and rescuing 
maidens from sexual harassment, a far from comprehensive 
judicial system. There were still trials though with an 
ordeal serving as jury. '. Great faith has been placed in trial 
by ordeal all the way from the Old Testament to the 
Australian Outback. The idea is that something out there 
knows whose guilty and will point to him if given the chance. 
The chance usually involves fire or water or poison. Poison 
is written' in the Bible and was popular in Africa and India 
for trials by ordeal. Those who survived it all, though 
likely to be ill were considered to be innocent. 
The Saxons developed a variation called 
(inaudible), a morsel of something that would show if you're 
guilty, perhaps their throats were dry with apprehension and 
Godwin, Earl of Kent is said to have choked on his. Under 
Saxon law if you could carry several pounds of glowing, red, 
hot iron in your bare hands for nine steps or walk barefoot 
over nine red hot plowshares without getting any blisters, 
you were not guilty. 
Similar proof was accepted in Hindu and Scandinavia 
law. In Britain, Africa and parts of Asia plunging your arm 
into boiling water, oil, or lead without the usual results 
proved your innocense. Water was also knowledgeable stuff. 
The innocent sank, the guilty floated and could be fished out 
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and dealt with. This was the customary method of identifying 
witches who were cross tied, thumb to toe before being thrown 
in. True witches refused to drown and were dried off and 
burned at the stake. Alongside this unidentified jurist 
prudence, the Saxons were actually working with the human 
jury system but it was available only to the honest. If your 
neighbors knew you for a liar or you had perjured yourself in 
the past or presumably if you were a stranger just passing 
through, you weren't oath worthy and went directly to the 
red, hot iron or the drowning pond. But if you were a person 
of honesty in your district and were accused of a crime you 
swore by the Lord "I am guiltless in both deed and counsel, 
of the charge of which yxr accuses me," and that was that. 
However, if you were accused by a group, you had to parry 
with a group of your own called compergators. You asked 11 
thanes, freeholders to join you and swear your honesty in the 
matter. If you couldn't round up 11 who believed you, you 
took off your shoes for the hot plowshares. 
In those days, honesty was. the best policy. 
Honesty and a loyal group of bribable drinking buddies. 
(Inaudible) noticed this flaw provided for a group of 12 
senior thanes to investigate an act as an accusatory jury. 
Eight votes could convict. Justice was still a neighborhood 
matter. Everyone was suppose to know everyone else and have 
some firsthand knowledge of what happened. 
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Rather recently we've turned this concept on its 
head and juries are suppose to know nothing at all before 
they sit down in the box, to be but empty vessels into which 
the liquor of admissible evidence is poured. In inflammatory 
cases a trial even gets moved to another area to insure jury 
indifference. 
When William the Conqueror took over England in 
1066 he left the Saxon system in place and added some Norman 
forces like trial by combat. Combat was a judicial 
entertainment similar to the gladiatorial in which right was 
thought to make might. Whoever was right would win. The 
accuser had to do battle with the accused causing the small 
and frail to think twice before complaining. But if you were 
no good at fighting you could hire someone to fight for you. 
The man with the fiercest hired help won rather like hiring 
the most expensive lawyer today. 
Ordeals fell into disuse in the 13th century but 
the right to trial by combat stayed on the books until 
Ashford vs. Thornton in 1819. By Norman times, laws were 
more complicated. So professionals called justice seers were 
sent around to keep an eye on the courts and rules of 
evidence rather like judges. They knew more about the law 
and less about what happened than the jurors did. 
We were told in school that jury trials sprang 
newborn from the Magna Carta, but juries were around before 
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1215. The Magna Carta just guaranteed them as a right not to 
be ignored by capricious powers like Bad King John. But some 
kings went right on being capricious anyway. 
In these enlightened times we merely torch the 
neighborhood if we don't like the verdict. But back then, 
juries got punished if the authorities didn't like it. Since 
juries were considered witnesses, a wrong vote was considered 
perjury. Acquitting unpopular or possibly treasonous people 
got jurors hauled into the star chamber where a group of the 
King's dear friends dealt severely with them. They lost 
their goods and chattels and were sent to jail for at least a. 
year. Sometimes their wife and children were thrown out of 
their house, the house demolished, the meadows destroyed and 
even the trees chopped down. A prudent jury weighed factors 
other than evidence. It was also the custom for the lawyer 
to pay each jurors several guineas or to take them all out to 
dinner. 
As we limped toward the 21st century, the world 
community of nosy neighbors has faded into history and the 
problem now is who are these jurors? Prince Morgan called 
them wise men. Under Edward I, they were to be 12 of the 
better men of the bailiwick, under George IV, good and lawful 
men. Except for adulteresses, witches and common scolds, 
history doesn't mention women. Perhaps they're a recent 
invention. It seems to have been so simple then naming our 
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good, wise, lawful peers. How do we choose among strangers 
not necessarily wise but merely registered to vote? Once the 
blatantly prejudice have been sent packing, both sides take 
up the peremptory challenge of turning down jurors for the 
way they look, dress, or comb their hair. The differing 
agendas of the prosecution and the defense complicate 
matters. 
Prosecution lawyer, Jeffrey Tubin says that when he 
first came to the bar he was told to avoid men with beards, 
too independent and teachers and social workers, too 
sympathetic, and aim for the little old Lutheran lady in 
pearls, quick to judge and slow to forgive. 
For the defense, Clarence Darrow advised not to 
take a German, they are bull-headed; rarely take a Swede, 
they are stubborn. Always take an Irishman or- a Jew, they 
are the easiest to move to emotional sympathy. He preferred 
old men for their tolerance, but Samuel Lee Woods liked them 
young for their still fresh sense of brotherhood and avoided 
self-made men, businessmen with close set eyes, writers, 
professors and former policemen. 
How are we doing? 
MS. SERASSIO: We're half done. 
THE COURT: Half done? Usually this is about when 
they get done. You'll just have to wait for a few minutes. 
Does anyone have any questions? I would tell you 
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that in a felony case, eight of you are called to serve on 
the jury. If this were a capital case involving the death 
penalty, it would be 12 of you. For a Class A Misdemeanor, 
six jurors and if it was a Class B Misdemeanor, there would be 
four. So since this is a felony case, eight of you will be 
selected to serve on the jury and each attorney gets four 
peremptory challenges. So there will be eight of you that 
will be stricken. 
And for the record, Mr. McCaughey, you did pass the 
jury for cause? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I think we need to approach for a 
minute. 
THE COURT: Okay, would you approach the bench? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Oh, we do pass for cause, yes. . 
THE COURT: And Ms. Serassio, you did pass the jury 
for cause? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes. 
THE COURT: Approach the bench. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: The concern (inaudible) is Juror 
No. 3 is struck by the State (inaudible) ability [inaudible] 
she needs to justify [inaudible]. 
•THE COURT: All right, do you have a reason for 
that? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yeah, (inaudible). 
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that in a felony case, eight of you are called to serve on 
the jury. If this were a capital case involving the death 
penalty, it would be 12 of you. For a Class A Misdemeanor, 
six jurors and if it was a Class B Misdemeanor there would be 
four. So since this is a felony case, eight of you will be 
selected to serve on the jury and each attorney gets four 
peremptory challenges. So there will be eight of you that 
will be stricken. 
And for the record, Mr. McCaughey, you did pass the 
jury for cause? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I think we need to approach for a 
minute. 
THE COURT: Okay, would you approach the bench? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Oh, we do pass for cause, yes. 
THE COURT: And Ms. Serassio, you did pass the jury 
for cause? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes. 
THE COURT: Approach the bench. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was.held as follows: 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: The concern (inaudible) is Juror 
No. 3 is struck by the State (inaudible) ability [inaudible] 
she needs to justify [inaudible]. 
• THE COURT: All right, do you have a reason for 
that? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yeah, (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: Why don't we put that on the record 
during the break? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Okay, I just wanted to inform you 
(inaudible). 
(End of sidebar) 
' THE COURT: All right. I'm going to read the eight 
of you who have been selected to serve on the jury. As I 
read your name if you would please stand. Robert Lewis 
Merkley, Jason Howard Fullmer, Kathryn Ashley Van Roosendahl, 
Delvin Brent Norman, Jeffrey Eugene Perry, Sean Christopher 
Smith, David Randall Campbell, and Richard Allen Brown. 
Ms. Serassio, is that the jury you have selected? 
MS. SERASSIO: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Those of you that are standing, stay 
where you are. Those of you that are not standing, thank you 
for your appearance today. I am going to release you from 
jury service. You're welcome to remain as a spectator if you 
so choose. Otherwise, have the rest of a good day. 
(Prospective jurors not selected excused) 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Murphy, if I can get you 
to move down a few spaces. Mr. Fullmer, you're next to him, 
Ms. VanRoosendahl, I'll have you sit next to Mr. Fullmer and 
then Mr. Norman next to Ms. Van Roosendahl. 
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And then the back row, Mr. Perry will be at the far 
end. Next to Mr. Perry will be Mr. Smith and then Mr. 
Campbell and then Mr. Brown. 
All right. Before you get too comfortable, I'll 
have you stand and I'll have my clerk swear you in as jurors 
in this case. 
(Whereupon the jury members were sworn) 
THE COURT: All right. Let me just talk to you for 
a few minutes. Just sit down. It's important that you sit 
in the same order. It's probably best if you kind of move 
closer to the witness box so if you just kind of slide down. 
You don't need to do it now, just when you come back and I'm 
kind of tall so I like to spread out. You don't need to have 
every seat filled. If you want to put a seat between you, 
that's fine. Just be as comfortable as you can. We'll 
usually take at least one morning recess which we'll do now, 
at least one or two afternoon recesses. Sometimes it's based 
upon witness situations. If for any reason you feel like you 
need a recess, maybe you're just getting a little tired, 
maybe there's a telephone call that you need to make, maybe 
need to use the restroom facilities, all you have to do is 
just raise your hand and say, you know, Judge, can we take a 
recess? I won't ask you why but I want you alert and fresh. 
So don't feel at all embarrassed about asking for a recess. 
Sometimes I have a tendency to just kind of plow through and 
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not take recesses when sometimes I think jurors would 
appreciate it or attorneys would appreciate a recess. All 
you have to do is just ask and I'll make sure we take one 
periodically. 
It's important that you not discuss this case among 
yourselves or allow others to discuss it with you during the 
pendency of the trial. We'll take a lunch recess. It's 
generally around the noon hour. I don't like to break into 
witness testimony if I think they will be relatively brief. 
So if it's about noon and I think we're about done with the 
witness, I'll usually allow that witness to finish so they 
can leave and we can finish the witness before starting again 
in the afternoon. 
I'm going to take a recess now, allow you to 
telephone anyone; your family, your business, anyone who may 
have been expecting you today. Let them know that you're 
serving on a jury and again, we do anticipate we'll finish 
today. Any questions from anybody? All right. We'll be in 
recess for about 10 minutes. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom). 
, THE COURT: The record will reflect that the jury 
has now left the courtroom. Mr. McCaughey did ask to 
approach the bench on a Bastan Challenge. I'll you make that 
on the record now Mr. McCaughey. 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Your Honor, based on the state's 
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taking off Juror No. 3, Mr. Chow, who clearly was the only 
minority on the jury, as I looked through my questions or 
excuse me, my notes on his answers, there's nothing in there 
that would indicate any reason to take him off the jury other 
than the fact that he was 27 years old and was obvious an 
Asian, of the Asian race and so I think the State has to 
justify why they took that person off the jury. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Serassio? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes, Your Honor, when I was watching 
him during the time that you were reading the story to the 
jurors, he was not paying attention. He kept putting his 
head down, he wasn't listening and that concerns me when 
someone doesn't want to pay attention. I also noted in my 
notes that he kept looking at me funny and so any time I get 
a bad feeling from a juror and if they're not paying 
attention, initially I was going to leave him on and then he 
just wasn't paying attention. He has to pay attention during 
the jury trial. 
I had concerns about (inaudible) Bunting as well 
but the defense had struck her. I didn't know if she would 
have any problems with her or anything but she was the 
defense struck her as number 4, but she was actually paying 
attention and listening to what you had to say and Jonathan 
was not paying attention. 
THE COURT: All right and for the record, Mr.• 
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Harris is not of Asian decent; is that correct, Mr. 
McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Even though obviously he is a minority. 
So, all right. Anything else we need to put on the record? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Judge, I guess my response to that 
is, it's hard for somebody to tell if somebody is paying 
attention. People have different ways of paying attention 
and this is a smaller room (inaudible) reading to them or 
talking to them and so the fact that somebody is looking 
around or something, I don't think is necessarily they're not 
paying attention. So I don't think that's sufficient, but 
just so the record is clear. 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. We'll recess 
for about 10 minutes. 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: For the record, you just have the one 
jury instruction? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Yes. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect the 
jury is back in the courtroom, all counsel and defendant are 
present. 
Members of the jury, what we're going to do first 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2, 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the 
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis 
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one 
years of age in such state. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress 
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
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Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including 
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102 (West 2004) Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 (West 2004) Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
